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" Amongst individuals, wealth gives power, and power gives security; but, this is only because there is another and greater power which secures the wealth; and, as there is no such power to superintend the wealth of nations, the rich nation is no more secure than the poor nation; nay, it is much less secure, being placed in a situation similar to that, in which a rich man would be without the protection of the magistrate, presenting to the plunderer the strongest of temptations with the weakest of obstacles."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. VI, page 612.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, (continued from p. 82).—I. *American States*. II. *Buenos Ayres*. III. *Volunteers*. IV. *The Army Estimates*. V. *Lord Wellesley*. —I. In the House of Commons, on the 20th instant, some questions were asked of Lord Howick by a Sir Thomas Turton, I think they call him, whom the reader may have before heard of, relative to the American States. It seems, if one can form a guess at their intentions, to be the design of the OUSTED TREASURY CLERKS, whom the Morning Chronicle persists in calling an "Opposition," to set up a very loud cry against whatever terms this treaty may contain; but, the ground they are prepared to take, is, that we ought to have strictly adhered to what they call the rule of 1756, from which rule, be it remarked, they supported Pitt in deviating from in several instances. But, this fact will not, I allow, make any thing in justification of the ministers, if they have given up any of our essential rights. To allow, in the way of grant for a particular purpose, and upon equitable conditions, any neutral nation to trade with France, during war, or even to be the carrier of French or French colonial produce, may, however be politic. There is a passage in a pamphlet lately published, under, it is said, the sanction of a person high in office, laying down principles, upon which a permission, or grant, of this sort may possibly have been made. It is this: "1. The destruction of an enemy's trade is not to be desired in order to annihilate his national wealth. 2. By the individual prosperity of his subjects we ourselves gain; by their progress in riches we improve our own; and though his public revenue may be augmented by the increase of his public wealth, we must necessarily augment our own revenue by the encrease which our wealth receives from his. 3. It is his progress in arms not in arts that is formidable; and there cannot be a doubt that an expedient, which renders him

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" richer and weaker, which augments the opulence of his people, and makes them harmless, which preserves their trade, but stunts the growth of their navy, is of all others the contrivance best suited to our interests. 4. *The surrender of the French commerce to the neutral nations is this expedient.*"—The Courier news-paper, which is the organ of the Ousted Clerks, cites this passage in confirmation of its apprehensions, that the ministers have made a disgraceful treaty with the American States; but, if they actually have made a treaty upon the great and enlightened principles expressed in the 3d sentence (I have numbered them for the sake of reference), though this principle may not be comprehensible to the Ousted Clerks, I shall entertain a hope, that they will never lose sight of that principle in any of their measures. Whether the expedient, described in the 4th sentence, would be efficacious as to the purpose in view, must depend much upon the circumstances of the case; and, without some explanation, to shew us, that *we*, as well as the enemy, are not rendered weak by the increase of our national wealth, we must, I think, regard the 2d sentence as militating against the argument contained in the third; for, it appears strange, first to say, that we shall grow rich by the increase of the enemy's national wealth, and then to say, that it will be good to suffer that wealth to increase, because it will enfeeble the enemy. The principle, however, laid down in the 3d sentence, I heartily agree to; and, it is not without some little pride, that I refer, as in my motto, to the letter to Pitt, a great part of which was occupied in an endeavour to prove and to illustrate the truth of that principle. Happy shall I be to find, that the ministers of England begin, at last, thus to think and to talk. After having, for so many, many years heard the shallow-brained Pitt and his still more shallow-brained followers, declaiming upon our "commercial greatness," our "inexhaustible resources," our "capital, credit, and commerce," as the sinews

of war, as the sure and certain means of triumph over our enemies; after having so long heard the master-declamer ranting away upon the beggared state of the enemy, and exulting, in strains of inimitable bombast, at seeing him "on the verge, nay, in "the very gulph of bankruptcy;" after seeing Lords Castlereagh and Hawkesbury drawing out and arraying our custom-house accounts, the lists of our canals, turnpike roads and bills of enclosure, against the armies of France; after all this senseless and disgusting talk, it is really a comfort to read, from under the reputed sanction of men in power, "that we ought *not* to desire to "diminish the national wealth or revenues "of our enemy; and that, whatever renders him *rich* does also render him *weak*." It is really a comfort to one's heart to hear this; and especially if one could but rely, that the ministers would begin and resolutely continue to *act* upon the principle. I am in hopes, too, that the nation, taught by woeful experience, will now receive and cherish this important truth; and I flatter myself, that, upon this point, as upon most others, the Ousted Clerks will meet with the contempt which their party cavilling is so eminently calculated to excite.—II. Buenos Ayres also was a subject of inquiry, on the part of Sir Thomas Turton; and, indeed, it was quite prudent in the Ousted Clerks to leave questions of this sort to be put by any other body, who was fond enough of hearing himself speak; for they were cunning enough to have perceived, that Buenos Ayres, the capture of which the wise Mr. Canning wished to see a topic of congratulation in the King's speech, began to be a little out of date. They were not such fools as to thrust themselves forward in any more inquiries about it; for re-captured, or not re-captured, they had discovered, that the gold-finders had, somehow or other, fallen into a state of unpopularity. From the beginning I expressed my regret at the capture; because I felt a conviction, that, supposing the undertaking to prove finally successful, as a military expedition, yet, it must prove greatly injurious to England; that it must add to our taxes, and to the patronage and the power of the crown, already, in my opinion, far too great, while there was not, as far as I could see, a possibility of the capture's producing any good at all, much less enough to counterbalance these evils. Of course I, in the preceding sheet, expressed my satisfaction at the report of the re-capture, which report I am now very glad to find confirmed, except as far as relates to the capture of our troops and stores, especially the former, who

will now, in all probability, have to remain a long while, penned up in a prison, in a country particularly unfavourable to them under such circumstances, and at the mercy of an enemy wantonly provoked against them, while their native land is, in part, *garrisoned by Hanoverians*. I trust, that the ministers will shew proper spirit with regard to the commanders of this expedition. The country demands it at their hands. How did Sir Home Popham and his associate know what the views of the government might be, with respect to Spain? He knew England was at war with that power; but, how did he know, that it was not the wish of the government to conciliate Spain as much as possible; or, at least, not to wound her with urgent necessity? From the opinions which the present ministers expressed at the time of the capture of the Spanish frigates, it is probable, that such were their wishes with regard to that power; and, shall the wishes of the government be thus baffled at pleasure, and for the gain of a greedy commander? But, as I observed in my last Number, if the plunder be suffered to remain in the hands of Sir Home Popham, nothing good can be done. The *Vase*, awarded him by the little government at Lloyd's, he may keep; nay, I would not grudge him a "heir-loom" of their granting. A "heir-loom!" A "heir-loom," granted by a club of stock-jobbers to be attached to an Earldom! What a scandalous mockery of that which has heretofore been held as one of the first acts of royalty! And yet, these same jobbers shall talk to you quite seriously about Buonaparte's degrading royalty. Let them, however; let them and the speculators of Birmingham and Manchester join in giving Sir Home Popham a heir-loom; but, let him not keep the plunder acquired at the expence of English taxes and English blood. This plunder, the public will recollect, was shipped home to the immaculate *Alexander Davison*, Sir Popham's banker; and the daily news-papers, with that base complaisance which they always shew towards those who are able and willing to pay them, announced to the well-dressed rabble that read them with delight, that "Mr. Davison's patriotic band, the St. James's corps of *Loyal British Volunteers*, were marched out to meet and "to guard the treasure." Yes, these *Loyal* heroes, blythe with Davison's beer, were marched out to guard the treasure gained by the captivity or the blood of their unfortunate countrymen! As far as *services* of this sort go, the volunteers will certainly prove a most efficient force. This feat of Sir Home Popham seems to be quite complete in all

its parts. The bare plunder was in character; but, it was sent home immediately; that object was put beyond the power of accident, and then, it is sent to Davison; and then Davison calls out his volunteer corps to guard it. Never was a piece better cast, or better kept up from the beginning to the end.—III. It is going a little out of the way, but I cannot help anticipating, in this place, the remarks that would present themselves upon Lord Castlereagh's eulogium (in the debate upon the army estimates, on the 21st instant) on the *disinterestedness* of the Volunteers. That *many* of them have been actuated by motives perfectly disinterested, I never either doubted, or expressed a doubt; and I am of the same opinion with regard to those who have taken a lead in raising such corps; but, as far as my *knowledge* goes, I speak with very few exceptions when I say, that the men of the volunteer corps have been actuated by motives far from disinterested, and that those who have raised such corps, have been dependents upon, or expectants of, the minister of the day. It was the same with the *car-subscription*, which I assisted in laughing down, though it had the unqualified approbation and encouragement of Pitt and that great, or chief, commander, the Duke of York. Upon that occasion a nest, nay, a whole rookery, of place-men, pensioners, and contractors, assembled at a tavern, and passed resolutions (in no very good English), proclaiming every man *disloyal*, who refused to contribute towards the project. Amongst the flock of *loyalists* were several harness-makers; and, as the deft Sir Brook (there is no occasion for his other name) only contracted with some of them for harness to draw the cars with, the rest took dudgeon thereat, and attacked Sir Brook most furiously in the news-papers; while the coach-masters, who subscribed to the project, took the same opportunity of subscribing, at the same place and time, a petition to parliament to lessen the tax upon coaches, as it pressed so hard upon "a meritorious and *loyal* part of the community." So much for their loyalty, and their *disinterestedness*, which, I imagine, will be found to be an humble invitation of the disinterestedness of Alexander Davison. When Davison raised his corps, his name, accompanied with an extolling of his liberality, his public-spirit, and his loyalty, appeared in the news-papers *every day*. The paragraphs were, I dare say, drawn up by himself, for they were illiterate and gross; and they were paid for at a guinea, or, in some of the papers, at half a guinea, perhaps, a piece. Any man, or any woman, no matter who or what,

may purchase praise at the same price and at the same hands. Yet, this is the *press* we boast of, as the reformer of morals, the mirror of truth, the nurse of science and of virtue, and the check upon tyrants and public-robbers! Never was there so vile a traffic as that carried on by this press. A thousand thousand times better would it be that there should be no press at all existing. The trade of bawds and pimps has been decried; but, whether as to its intrinsic business, or as to its evil effects upon society, it is virgin innocence compared to the trade of the press, when practised as above described.—Nor does the English *pencil* yield, in this respect, to the press. A large portrait of Davison has been exhibited at the print-shops in London, by the side of those of Mr. Fox, and Lord Nelson: but, on Monday last, when the Third Report had begun to be a subject of general conversation, it was *taken down*!—What shocking baseness is this! I do not believe that an equal to it is to be found in the history of any nation upon earth. This man has, I understand, been recently purchasing large estates in Northumberland; ten of our best painters are now employed by him to paint pictures at an enormous price for the furnishing of a gallery which he has a design of erecting, to be called "*the Davison Gallery*!" He appears literally to roll in riches, to expend gold by handfulls, to wallow in luxuries of all sorts, while hundreds of thousands of the people of England, from whose property and labour his riches have been extorted, are, some of them, living in constant dread of the tax gatherer, and others wasting away for want of a sufficiency even of bread. And, *this is the state of things*, to preserve which, his friend, Mr. Sheridan, calls upon us, in his hours of jollity too, "to sacrifice the necessaries of life!" Good God! How is it *possible*, that we can be worse served, or more cruelly insulted?—Not a word, however, of complaint do we hear, upon this subject, from those base and detestable daily news-papers with which the metropolis swarms. The money extorted from the country to fill Davison's coffers will also silence this press, which, I again and again repeat it, is the greatest curse that ever was inflicted upon a country.—IV. *The Army Estimates* gave rise, on the 21st and 23d instant, to two debates. Upon the laying of documents like these before the House of Commons, before "the guardians of the public purse," what one would naturally look for, is, an examination into the necessity of granting so much money as they propose to the House to grant. One would expect to hear the members ob-

ject, if they objected to any thing, either to the amount of the force, or the sum. The occasion would naturally offer itself for members to shew, if they had it in their power, that the sum granted for the army, last year, was improperly expended; to point out how savings might be made; and to expose to the House any abuses which had come to their knowledge. Instead of any thing in this way; instead of any serious and earnest inquiries as to whether the Barrack and other abuses were corrected; instead of any objection to the enormous sums charged for the mere mustering of the soldiers; instead of any calculation to shew how small a portion, comparatively, is paid to the officer and the soldier; instead of any calculation to shew, that the hospital expenses are beyond all credibility of the necessity of the case; instead of any remarks to shew how dearly we are made to pay for the protection afforded us by the Generous Hanoverians; instead of any thing of this sort, we find that there were about fourteen hours spent in debates upon the relative merits of Mr. Pitt's and Mr. Windham's military plans; that some score or two of jests were cracked, and some three or four score of stories told; and this is called *debating* the army estimates! As to Mr. Windham's plan, it appears to have done but little in the way of *raising men*, and that I always expected from it; but, while it has been, even in this way, better than the plan of Mr. Pitt, it has done no harm; it has given the country no trouble and vexation; and, it has, at any rate, put an end to the trouble and vexation which the other plan so abundantly gave. There are, however, certain parts of it which have done great good. It has added to the means of subsisting in those soldiers, who were *already pensioners*, and a great part of whom were also street beggars, or were in some parish workhouse; and, it has taken from the colonel, or commanding officer for the time being the power of preventing any man, who has served a certain time, from having a pension. This was a part of the plan which Lord Castlereagh complained of, but it is a part, I am confident, which every just and considerate man will highly approve of. All men are liable to prejudice and caprice; and now that we have so many colonels (to say nothing of a regiment being often left to the command even of a captain), is it not to be monstrously uncharitable to suppose it possible, that two or three out of the number, may be either tyrants or fools; and, in such case, would it not be cruel to the last degree, to leave it in their power to send the worn-out soldier starving to his grave?—

During the time of service his power over the soldier is almost absolute. He can punish almost at his pleasure. He can shut against him, by his sole will, the door of promotion; he can, in like manner, always imprison him; for an irreverent look or gesture he can cause him to be flogged; and will my Lord of Castlereagh, will this gentle and smooth Lord, in this land of melting humanity, where schools of reform and retreats for prostitutes are daily rising up; will he pretend, that it is a *fault* in Mr. Windham's plan, that it considers a number of years of military service as a proof that the person serving has a claim to future protection from his country; or, will he say, that discipline cannot be preserved by the terrors and the taste of the lash, without thereunto adding the power of starving the soldier after he is no longer able to serve? But, while Mr. Windham must, I think, be regarded, by all but tyrants, as being completely triumphant in this argument, is he not aware that it applies, with equal force, to the case of the *officers* of the army, who are now, he must very well know, liable to be cashiered, at any moment, without a trial; and even without cause assigned, *by the sole will of the King*, and that, too, *without any responsibility* in the ministers or in any body else? I shall be told, perhaps, that it is a species of blasphemy to admit, even by way of hypothesis, that the King should act tyrannically or capriciously towards any of his subjects, and particularly towards a veteran officer. I am aware, also, that the same will be said with respect to the present Commander in Chief; and, as I am by no means ambitious of adding to the titles of jacobin and leveller (so liberally bestowed on me) that of blasphemous, I shall not suppose such a thing even *possible*. But, nothing prevents me from supposing, that some king, hereafter to be born, may be a tyrant, an unjust, a vindictive, and capricious tyrant, who will stretch his power to the utmost, and, in such a case (for Mr. Windham's plan is formed for futurity), where would be the security of the officers of the army, especially if such a king were to select for his Commander in Chief a man resembling himself in these respects, thereunto adding cowardice so rank and profligacy so notorious, as to make him regard every brave and virtuous man as a living libel upon himself, and accordingly, a proper object of his unbridled vengeance? There is, moreover, another point of view, in which I would wish Mr. Windham, as the friend, which I know him to be, of the real liberties of his country, to view the power of

which I am speaking; and that is in its *political* effects, especially while officers of the army are allowed to be members of the House of Commons. I shall have no objection to their being members of that House, after it be proved to me, that they can attend their duty there without neglecting their military duty; but, when this proof has been furnished me, I shall still ask, how they can be regarded as *independent* men, so long as the king has the absolute power of cashiering, that is to say, *ruining* them, in fortune or fame, and perhaps both, without a trial, and without cause assigned? I am not to be told, that there are no military and naval officers in the present House of Commons, who are not independent men; and I want not to be reminded, that it is quite absurd to suppose, that the present king or his apparent successor, would ever cashier an officer, or what is called *take his regiment from him*, merely because he had voted on the wrong side; but, the plan is for futurity, and as Mr. Windham looks deep into time, I am astonished that he should not have thought of some check to this possible, though improbable, abuse of power; and, after much reflection upon the subject, I can in no way account for the omission, but, in supposing, that Mr. Windham, never having known, or heard of a naval or military officer's giving his vote from the hope of promotion or from the fear of being cashiered or laid upon the shelf, and never having known, or heard of, any officer's having been so treated in consequence of giving his vote against the minister of the day, did not, even by accident, think of any such check as that which the reader will perceive I have in contemplation, and which is no other than similar to that which he has with so much justice and humanity, provided for the soldier, namely, security against utter ruin, except in cases of guilt, proved upon trial.—Upon the *additional expense* of Mr. Windham's plan, Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval have, at different times, expatiated largely, insomuch, that a hasty observer would almost forget that they had been followers of the squandering Pitt, the patron of the Trotters, the Delanceys, the Davisons, and thousands of their like, and would take them for most rigid “guardians of the public purse.” But, while we hear them thus swelling out the expense attendant on the addition made to the pensioner's allowance, to the pay of veteran soldiers, and the miserable pittance, hardly worth naming, doled out to the officers of the infantry, while those of the cavalry are left to purchase their new wallets and furs

and whiskers upon their old pay; while we hear them so loudly declaiming against this “enormous” expense, not a word do we hear from them about the expense of those snug sinecures called barrack-masterships; not a word about the ten thousand pounds a year sinecure to the Apothecary General; not a word about the three thousand pounds a year to the younger Sheridan as muster-master at *home*, while he is receiving pay as a captain of a foot regiment which is *abroad* upon hard duty; not a word about Mr. Huskisson's six hundred pounds a year for being a something or other to the army in Ceylon; not a word about the endless train of commissaries and contractors, who, with the money raised in taxes, are purchasing the estates of those whom those taxes have ruined; not a word about the expense of the office of Commander in Chief and its staff. No: there is no coming this way without rubbing, somewhere or other, against a friend or a relation; yet it is *here*, it is in the branches where little or no duty is performed for the pay, that the saving of money might be made. Into these, had I been a member of parliament, would I have dived. I would have set myself seriously about the inquiry. I would have shewn what was thus expended. I would have proved that it was in no wise conducive to the public good; but, that, on the contrary, while it added to the pecuniary burdens of the people, it added also to the means of depriving them of their political and civil liberties. This would I have done; and I would not have been diverted from my purpose by a few snips of Latin, nor by the old thread-bare stories about a crook-backed poet and priest's maid, which I had heard my old comrades, round the guard-room fire, repeat a hundred times from the jests of Joe Miller.—V. LORD WELLESLEY. On the 26th instant Lord Viscount Folkestone brought forward, in the House of Commons, his promised motion relative to the Oude papers; that is to say, that the papers, which were before printed, upon the motion of Mr. Paull, respecting Lord Wellesley's conduct towards the Nabob and province of Oude, but which papers had been annulled by the dissolution of parliament, should be again printed. Lord Howick did not repeat the arguments, which he made use of, when Lord Folkestone gave notice of his intended motion; but, as minister, and with all the air of an official defender of Lord Wellesley, he rose to question Lord Folkestone as to the *time* and *manner* of his future proceedings, and asked him whether he intended to bring forward all the charges that Mr. Paull has brought forward? In this

questioning Lord Howick was joined by *Sir John Anstruther*, of whom we will speak more particularly by-and-by; and this latter seemed very anxious to ascertain the precise time, and mode of proceeding of Lord Folkestone, whose answer was, in substance, this; that he pledged himself to bring forward no charge, except upon the subject of Lord Wellesley's conduct in Oude, which was the only part of his conduct that he had, as yet, fully made up his mind upon; that, with respect to the money charge, he certainly did not mean to bring that forward; that, as to the question of the Carnatic, he should leave that to the *Right Honourable* the Treasurer of the Navy, who had called for the proofs upon that subject in 1802, and who had solemnly pledged himself to the House and to the country to bring forward and prosecute a charge thereon. This, after two intervening speakers, brought up Mr. Sheridan, who, in the paper of his bosom friend and brother place-man Mr. Perry of the *Morning Chronicle*, is reported to have said: "that the motion had his approbation, and he hoped that the noble mover would not consider his having declined to notice the allusion which he had thought proper to make to him as the effect of any disrespectful inattention. The noble lord, in announcing his conditional notice, had expressed his hopes that the original mover of these papers would succeed in his petition—[No, said Lord Folkestone; I stated that such was the hope of Mr. Paull]. Oh, that he had such hopes (added Mr. Sheridan) was extremely probable. He was, no doubt, a very active canvasser and sanguine politician, but he must excuse me (said Mr. S.) if I decline to sympathize in his hopes. (a laugh). But as to the noble lord, he announced his resolution to pursue a different course from that followed by his hon. friend. Then of course he disapproved of his hon. friend's mode of proceeding. It was rather surprising that the noble lord did not, in the course of the last, or the preceding sessions, advise his hon. friend to abandon that mode. It was not quite so friendly not to have given the hint. But a word or two as to the pledge to which the noble lord had alluded. If that noble lord had been present, he might have heard him, two or three times, state distinctly, in that house, the reasons which produced the delay complained of, and also the grounds upon which he thought proper to decline bringing forward this question. He, however, utterly denied that he had ever

forfeited the slightest pledge on this business. He denied any man even to catch him tripping. All that he ever said, and the grounds upon which he acted, he was ready to repeat again, and upon that re-petition would confidently rest for the justification of his conduct. Whenever that conduct was fairly represented and clearly understood, he could have no fear of censure. He was now prepared to declare, that if *any other person*, whoever that person might be, should bring forward this question, he would most distinctly pledge himself to give that person his most zealous, sincere, and strenuous assistance—to exert as much of his humble ability in favour of the motion, as if it were actually brought forward by himself."—What *truth* there is in the speech, as thus published by the place-hunter Perry, we shall see presently; but we must first give the reply of Lord Folkestone, who did not, in spite of Mr. Sheridan's positive assertions, seem to have been shaken in his opinion.—His lordship replied, that he would not enter into a controversy with the *Right Honourable* Gentleman upon the subject of his former pledges. But he recollected very accurately that the right hon. gent. did promise to bring this question of the Carnatic before the house. As to the grounds upon which he was induced to abandon that question, he really was not apprised of them. He had heard something of the right hon. gent.'s unwillingness to excite unpleasant feelings among his colleagues in office—that is, in plain English, *that he was not willing to lose his place*. The noble lord was, however, glad to hear the right hon. gent.'s pledge this evening. For his strenuous and sincere assistance, wherever he would be strenuous and sincere, would be a most important acquisition indeed. The noble lord repelled the idea that he was the substitute of Mr. Paull or any man; he was acting from a sense of duty, and even the friends of lord Wellesley ought to be obliged to him for the course he was about to take, as it would afford them an opportunity of vindicating his character—and the character of their country also, which was stained by the acts imputed to him; if these imputations should prove to be unjust, he declared that he should feel highly gratified, for he had no personal prejudice whatever against lord Wellesley. As to the course he meant to pursue, it would be open to any other member to propose a different course, if he thought fit, and this course

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" would not at all interfere with those who
 " wished to go the length of impeachment."

—Upon this the *Right Honourable* Sheridan is reported to have risen again, and to have observed *with some warmth*, " that no
 " doubt the noble lord wished to have his
 " public conduct ascribed to proper motives,
 " and if he expected to have credit given
 " him for such motives, he would not be so
 " forward to impute improper motives to
 " others. (*Hear, hear!*) With regard to
 " the motive which the noble lord had
 " thought proper to attribute to him, he
 " would ask that noble lord to state in what
 " part of his public conduct he had ever
 " seen any thing to justify the imputation
 " he had attempted to fix upon him, to
 " shew that he would be induced to abandon his principles from a love of place; or
 " to sustain against him any charge of inconsistency. If the noble lord had had a correct recollection of the proceedings of that house, the noble lord would have known
 " that he did, two years before the present
 " ministry came into place, state the
 " grounds upon which he was induced to
 " decline bringing forward this question respecting the Carnatic, at the same
 " time, pledging himself to support any
 " person who should bring it forward."—

It was the place-hunting crew in the stranger's gallery, doubtless, that exclaimed "*hear! hear!*" upon this occasion; for, was there ever an argument more fallacious, than that, if you impute improper motives to others, upon proof however clear, you yourself must be suspected of acting upon similar motives? Yes: it must have been the crew of the daily press, in the gallery, that cried "*hear! hear!*" at an argument like this. But, as to the *fact*; the simple fact of Mr. Sheridan's forfeiting his pledge with respect to the Carnatic. I can count a score, at least, of other pledges, which he has forfeited to the public. Upon the question of the Irish Catholics, or Parliamentary Reform, of the Pension List, of the India Bill, of the Sedition Bills; and upon many, many other questions, I will produce his pledges to the people, to the people from whom he stole that unmerited popularity, of which I had the honour in assisting to deprive him. But, for the present, let us content ourselves with the pledge upon the question of the Carnatic; a question which he took up in the spring of 1802. He was, even then, playing some selfish game about it; for he put off his motion for papers so often, and upon pretences so unsatisfactory, that, at last, Mr. Nicholl, gave notice, that if Mr. Sheridan delayed any longer

to take up the matter, he would take it up. Thus pushed, and having, probably, failed in some object to be obtained by his forbearance, down he came, burning with a patriot flame and melting with humanity; and, towards the close of a speech, in which he seriously attacked Mr. Nicholl for presuming to entertain a suspicion of his motives, and in which he justly described the transactions in the Carnatic as the most tyrannical and abominable that the world had ever heard of, he made his pledge in the following words: " I shall be satisfied if ministers (the Addingtons) will take up the matter, in such a way as to bring it to a full and fair investigation; but, if they do not, I PLEDGE *myself* to take it up in such a way, that, if the government of India has been guilty of the inordinate acts now charged upon them, the British nation, at least, shall be rescued from the suspicion of giving countenance to acts so *flagrant and atrocious*." Whereupon he moved for papers, which papers he very quietly suffered to lie unproduced until the *very last day* of the session of 1803, having, as the public will not fail to recollect, been coquetting with the Addington's, and sometimes sitting upon the Treasury Bench, during the interval. He says now, that he formally gave up the inquiry two years before he came into place. I recollect nothing of this; and, the only giving up of this question by him, that I believe ever was publicly made, was on the 22d of April last, in these words: " I retain my former sentiments respecting the transactions in the Carnatic; but, I have expressed, in confidence, to the hon. gent. (Mr. Francis), the impropriety of introducing any subject, that would have a tendency to divide his Majesty's ministers, at this important crisis. A time may come, perhaps, when the subject may be taken up with advantage; but, I do not think, that the present moment is a favourable one"—Is this *breaking a pledge*, honest reader, or is it not? As to his having said, two years before, that he would not take up the question; first, I do not believe the fact; and, secondly, if the fact be true, all that he gains by it is, that he broke his pledge two years sooner than we thought of; and, instead of breaking it for the sake of *keeping* a place, broke it for the sake of *getting* a place to keep. At any rate the motive imputed to him by Lord Folkestone will, to every impartial man, appear to be the real motive, however it may be attempted to be disguised.—Mr. Wellesley Pole took occasion to compliment Lord Folkestone upon

the delicacy, with which he had introduced the subject, and to draw a contrast disadvantageous to the conduct of Mr. Paull; the manliness of which must be much admired, when we consider that he never threw out any imputations against Mr. Paull, when the latter was present to answer him. He now charges Mr. Paull with *malevolence*. It has been amply *proved*, that that gentleman's conduct could not be fairly ascribed to any improper motive; and, let it be observed, that, when both were in the House, Mr. Paull has, over and over again, called upon this Mr. Wellesley to show that any ground for a contrary suspicion existed; and never has the latter been able to answer such call. —Mr. Wellesley Pole now asserts, that the charges against his relation of rapine, robbery, and murder, are wholly unsupported by proof, but, when the charge and the evidence were lying upon the table of the House, Lord Archibald Hamilton declared, that those charges were substantiated by the proof adduced. And, if this declaration was correct, will a mere resolution of disapprobation, on the part of the House, be adequate to the charges and proofs, upon which it will be founded? Will it “rescue,” to use the words of Mr. Sheridan's pledge, “the British nation from the suspicion of giving countenance to such acts?” —As to the contrast between the *language* of Lord Folkestone and that of Mr. Paull, at the introduction of the question, I appeal to the report of the debate (see Parl. Deb. April 22, 1805), whether Mr. Paull's language was not full as moderate as that of Lord Folkestone, not forgetting the important circumstance, that his conduct received the unqualified approbation of Mr. Windham and the Prince of Wales. The situation of Lord Folkestone is very different *now* from what Mr. Paull's was, at any stage of the proceedings. His lordship is to get papers *unopposed*; whereas Mr. Paull had to fight, inch by inch, for papers; and, in this contest, it was absolutely necessary, that he should insist upon the *criminality* of the acts, to prove which to the House these papers were wanted, and it was equally necessary for him to use such language as could alone convey an adequate idea of those acts. —Mr. Whitbread is pleased to compliment my Lord Folkestone for having brought forward the question, and to say, that the country is indebted to him for it. In these sentiments no one joins with more cordiality than I do; but, when Mr. Whitbread was thanking his Lordship for having so nobly embarked in this “important and arduous undertaking,” I would, had I

been in the House, have asked him, whether the undertaking was more important *now* than it was when Mr. Paull embarked in it; and, I would have asked him, when, at what period, in what single instance, he ever lent his assistance to Mr. Paull, ever gave him the smallest encouragement to proceed, ever once said that the undertaking was of any importance at all, ever paid Mr. Paull a single compliment upon the many proofs of his integrity and perseverance, until, at the Westminster election, he found it convenient so to do, in order to recover some little matter of his lost popularity. It was at Westminster, it was at the hustings of Covent Garden, whither, observe, too, he was brought by Mr. Paull, that Samuel Whitbread was taught the *importance* of the proceedings against Lord Wellesley; and, he may rest assured, that the people, who were his teachers upon that occasion, will not be satisfied by a mere resolution of disapprobation upon the Oude charge only, without obtaining even a *sight* of the money charge, showing how millions upon millions of English taxes have been expended in India, and how far we owe our oppressions at home to that expenditure. From the merit of my Lord Folkestone, whom I have always considered as one of the soundest men, both in head and in heart, that this kingdom affords. I am, I trust, one of the last to endeavour to detract; but, I am sure, his lordship's justice will make him set very little value upon any compliment paid him at the expence of Mr. Paull, had it not been for whose exertions, for whose integrity and perseverance, assailed as they were from all quarters, his lordship and the public would, to this hour, have been in almost total darkness as to the deeds of Lord Wellesley, who would, in all probability, have been, at this moment, a leading member of the cabinet. We owe to Mr. Paull, not only a knowledge, and now a thorough knowledge, of the conduct of Lord Wellesley, but also of the conduct of the East India Company, and of those complicated concerns (before involved in mystery), through the means of which this suffering country has long been deprived of the fruit of its labour; insomuch, that, when we are now called upon for taxes to support the East India Company, we know how to reason; we know what answer to give; we know how to judge of the conduct and the motives of our rulers. For all this, and for much more, we are indebted to Mr. Paull, towards whom I, for my part, entertain my full share of public gratitude; and, it is not an indiscreet expression, uttered, or written, in a moment of haste or of

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warmth, that will ever create in me a lukewarmness as to any public enterprise in which he may be engaged.—There is a Sir John Anstruther, who appears, from the report of the debate upon Lord Folkestone's motion, to have been extremely zealous in the cause of Lord Wellesley. This gentleman has lately returned from being Chief Justice of India, where he had a salary of £7,000. a year, and, after having resided at Calcutta seven years upon this salary, he has, upon his retirement, had a pension of £3,000. a year settled upon him for life by the East India Company, which pension, as well as the former salary, we, the people of England, have paid, and shall continue to pay. This gentleman was one of the *leaders of the prosecution against Mr. Hastings*! He has, I understand, been lately appointed by Lord Grenville, *judge* of the causes that come before the Privy Council, to which is affixed a salary of £1,500. a year; and, I have heard, that this place is to be made a *patent* one for him; that is to say, we are to have the honour to pay him this salary for his life certain! Who would not, for such a purpose, give up, at Mr. Sheridan's call, "the necessities of life?" What base dog is there, who would grudge to mortgage his last acre, or sell the shirt off his back rather than leave this salary unpaid?

CONTINENTAL WAR.—I have this morning been reading some dozen columns of foreign intelligence, and some half dozen of newspaper comments thereon; and the conclusion, in my mind, is, that the reports communicated to the ministers, and published by them, on Saturday last, respecting the battles in Poland, are *totally false*; and, that the French accounts of the operations in that country are *substantially true*. "If we deceive ourselves the truth is not in us;" and, surely, never were there poor wretches, who deceived themselves so grossly as we of this newspaper nation have done for these eighteen months past. Seventeen times have we (not I, however) believed the Emperor Napoleon to be completely overthrown; twice have we believed, that he himself was mortally wounded; and once, that his army were dead with the dysentery! His men are like Mr. Bays's: they rise up and fight after they are dead. I cautioned Mr. Perry against placing any very great reliance upon his favourite ally, the dysentery; for, I was apprehensive, that it would not, in a French army, operate as it did in the Brunswicker's army in Champagne. I perceive, however, through all the exultation of the Morning Chronicle, a consciousness that the government news is false. I see the

sense and reason of Mr. Spankie endeavouring to break through the cloud of his partner's stupidity. I see the difficulty that the former is in to know how he shall bring himself off. He is beginning to muster his thoughts and to marshal his arguments for the purpose of securing a decent retreat. Hence it is, that we hear him say, "whether the government news be true or not, the French have suffered severe losses, there can be no doubt of that." Yes, there can, Sir, and I entertain that doubt. I do not see any probability of their having suffered any loss at all; and, what is more, I do not see any prospect of their suffering a loss, or of their career being stopped by any thing but the elements. It is impossible for us to know what the intentions of Napoleon are; but, my opinion is, that, if he has a design upon Russia, the French standards will be flying at St. Petersburg before May-day. Such are *my* fears, notwithstanding all the flowry prospects, which the newspapers present.

My VIth Letter to the Electors of Westminster was ready; but, the two following letters, upon important subjects, now under the consideration of parliament, compel me to put off the publication of it for another week.

MILITARY FORCE.

(Concluded from p. 126)

Had the French been at liberty to employ any considerable part of their regular force against these insurgents, they would have been very soon subdued. As to what M. S. states about the Romans having no army in pay till after the siege of Veü, it proves nothing at all. The Roman troops, I believe, until the siege of Veü returned home during the winter, but except during that interval they were constantly in the field, and more inured to the hardships and perils of war than the troops with whom they had to contend, and, consequently, they vanquished them. M. S. remarks, that the Continent has been ruined in despite of standing armies. But what inference does he mean to draw from this? Not surely that the continental powers would have made a more successful struggle, if they had been defended by a more irregular rout of force. This is such a blind perversion of history, that he who seriously resorts to it appears to me to be quite beyond the reach of argument. Does it follow, that because one regular army beats another regular army, that, therefore, it would have been successfully opposed by an irregular force. It would, one should imagine, be more conformable, both to sound

logic and to common sense, to argue *a fortiori* against irregular troops. As to pensions and sinecure places, I am not aware that there is any sort of connection between that subject, and the propriety of raising and maintaining a regular force. That there may be too many pensions and sinecure places I can readily believe; but, at the same time, I do not see that any great reformation will be produced in this respect, until a reformation take place in the selfish principles of human nature. There are not, I suppose, more sinecure places, nor are they more unworthily bestowed at present, than at any former period; and, although the great majority of mankind are always ready to practise every sort of fawning servility for a place, it does not follow that all those who accept of places are of that description. There are, indeed, in all parties a sort of underlings, who consider attachment to party as a sort of sordid speculation, which brings them in possession of emolument and influence when their party is in power; and it is in the fond hope of those halcyon days, that they patiently suffer a proscription from power and profit, until a revolution in the state shall happen favourable to their wishes. Against these sort of people you need not rail. Even if you were to prevail so far as to awaken them from their golden slumber, they would only reply to you in the words of the Jew

Unless you rail the seal from off the bond
You do but waste your wind.

B.—*Jan. 9, 1807.*

SUGAR TRADE.

SIR,—In my last letter (p. 24) I made it appear, not only that the money returns from Sugar estates for a long time past, had not kept pace with those derived from any other employment of our capital and industry, but, that what little success had taken place within the last 30 years in the price of sugar, was greatly insufficient to defray the addition to the *direct* charges alone affecting the article which had been incurred during the former period. On this head, therefore, I shall not give you much further trouble. I will, however, remind you, that the mere customs on sugar have been augmented more than four-fold since the commencement of the American war. They were then 6s. 8d. they are now 27s. per cwt. In the last session of parliament a contingent addition of 3s. per cwt. (making the aggregate 30s.) was enacted, to take place in case the average price of the commodity should be 50s. per cwt. This tax, indeed, has not yet operated, Buonaparté's measures for the exclusion of

British sugar from the Continent, having kept the average price of that article far enough below 50s. per cwt. The present price is about 37s. Thus this intended tax (which as I recollect was taken as likely to produce an annual revenue of 300,000l.) has not hitherto yielded one single farthing to the Exchequer. I do indeed, hope from the considerate justice of the present administration, that the act for imposing it will be repealed; for, in addition to its actual inefficiency, it is demonstrably of the most oppressive and cruel tendency. A crop of sugar, more than almost any other produce of the south, is liable to be damaged by unfavourable seasons; *modò sol nimius, modò corripit imber*. A very wet or a very dry season (calamities the frequency and intensity of which in tropical climates can scarcely be imagined by those, who have not witnessed them) will take off more than nine-tenths from the expected produce of a field of sugar canes. By the fundamental laws of God and nature, all other cultivators of the earth are enabled, when the quantity of their crops is diminished, to derive some alleviation of their distress from an enhanced price. This is the ordinance of our bounteous Creator, always dealing out his chastisements with mercy, and tempering his very curses. This is that beneficent course of things which we call *nature*, in all cases consistent with the will, and conducive to the purposes of that Great Being, by whose wisdom it was decreed, and by whose power it is upheld. This corrective dispensation in the case of the sugar grower, Mr. Pitt thought fit to thwart; and with the unfeeling undistinguishing rapacity of a financier, he so diminished the drawbacks on the exportation of British plantation sugar, (thereby at the same time giving our rivals an advantage in every foreign market) and, consequently, so impeded the sale of it in years of failing crops, that the unhappy planter is effectually precluded from the possibility of obtaining that increase of price, which alone could afford him any—it would at best be a very inadequate—compensation, for the diminution in quantity of the produce of his land. Now, it is manifest, that the tendency of the 3s. contingent duty which I have mentioned, precisely the same, so far as the sugar planter is concerned, with that of the wicked diminution of the drawbacks effected by Mr. Pitt. Its tendency plainly is to keep the price of sugar below that point, to which without this unnatural and cruel interference it would rise, in alleviation of the calamity of a deficient crop. So far as the consumers are affected, the operation of this tax (if it ever

should operate) would be not less unreasonable; though the oppression being diffused among so much more numerous a body, would not be so severely felt by the individuals composing it. Sugar is now in this country a necessary of comfortable life. To all the consumers of it in a time of scarcity, the language of the 3s. contingent duty would be this, "By an unfavourable season, the quantity of sugar produced this year is so much less than usual, that (notwithstanding our foolish and wicked interference to obstruct the natural course of things) the price of it is arrived at an uncommon height. This being the case, seeing that you are already incommoded by the inevitable dearth of this necessary of life, we, your governors will interpose again; and since sugar is already so dear as to prevent your easily enjoying the use of it so amply as you might desire, we will impose on it a new duty, in order to make the purchase of it still more costly and difficult." On this subject it is scarcely needless to say more. I will only repeat my hope, that the considerate justice of the present administration, will forthwith expunge this 3s. duty from the statute book, where it stands at present unprofitable as a source of revenue, impotent of all good, and operative only as the legitimate cause of constant apprehension and inexpressible discontent. It cannot escape the observation of our financiers, and it should on no account escape their recollection, that in the present times they are most particularly bound to secure to all persons of property a sufficient income from their possessions. In 1797, Mr. Burke computed (third letter to a member of parliament, p. 95), that a full third of the expenditure of people of property went in taxes direct and indirect. The amount of the taxes imposed since that time, is (exclusive of the tax on property) considerably more than half the amount of those which existed before. I will, however, take them at only the half of that amount. And upon this low supposition, the aggregate will be according to Mr. Burke's computation 10s. in the pound, to which must be added 2s. for the property tax; and it will be seen, that of every 20s. added to the income of West Indian proprietors, (who are proverbial for a liberal, not to say profuse expenditure) 12s. is returned by them to the Exchequer in the form of taxes, without noticing the farther augmentation of the revenue, brought about by the increased incomes and expenditure of those other numerous classes, which the expenses of the West Indian proprietors contribute to enrich. Considerations of this sort, I should think would have their weight

to prevent our legislature from grudging to our West Indian proprietors at this time even an ample income, if they could obtain it from their possessions. Any thing of that sort is, however, completely out of the present question. So different is their condition, that, as I proved in my former letter, and, as indeed, seems to be generally felt and acknowledged, unless some new opening be effected for the consumption of their produce, the owners of the West Indian sugar estates must in a very short time be absolutely ruined. I desire to be understood literally, when I affirm that *they must be absolutely ruined*.—It seems to be agreed, that justice, as well as policy, demands the adoption of some measures to avert this ruin: I shall, therefore, not stop to describe the extent of it, or the horrible consequences which would accompany it; but will immediately proceed to suggest some modes of prevention.—1. In the first place, the old drawback (what is called a *bounty* in the case of *refined* sugar, is notoriously in substance nothing more than a drawback) upon sugar should be restored, such as it stood before Mr. Pitt meddled with it. This would produce two good effects; it would promote that just principle on which I have already insisted, of alleviating by increased price the calamity of short crops; and it would also, by preventing the interruption of our intercourse with foreign markets for sugars (to which Mr. Pitt's alteration of the drawback system gave rise), prevent the establishment of new connections with our rivals, which new connections when once established it may be impossible to dissolve, though they might so easily have been prevented.—2. So long as Buonaparté continues to prohibit the admission of our colonial staples into the countries under his domination or influence, we should likewise prohibit the admission into our own dominions of all brandies and other spirits, the produce of France, Spain, Holland, Italy, or any other country directly or indirectly under his rule. We can certainly do without those foreign spirits. Our own rums and spirits distilled from corn and sugar, together with the brandies of Portugal, would abundantly supply the greatest demand for spirits that we can ever know. And it should never for one moment be out of our recollection, that, as on the one hand the preferable use of spirits produced in our own colonies, and brought from thence in our own shipping, tends to enrich our own subjects, and promotes in a high degree a most valuable nursery of our seamen, the instrument of our naval greatness; so on the other, every sixpence which

is paid for the purchase of the brandies of France, Spain, and Italy, or the gin of Holland, gives employment and encouragement to the shipping of foreign nations, and contributes in one way or other to the support of those armies, by which Buonaparté has made himself master of the better part of Europe; and by which, as his ultimate object, to crown his work of conquest and of ruin, he hopes to effect the overthrow of this our empire: of which object he never does, and never will lose sight — 3. A permanent addition should be made to the duties on all *foreign spirits*. (By this denomination, I of course mean spirits the growth of foreign nations, and the property of foreigners, as contradistinguished from home made spirits, our own rums, the produce of our own countries, the property of our own subjects). The old protecting duties, so called, because they were designed to protect our rums from the too advantageous competition of foreign spirits, were altered by Pr. Pitt's commercial treaty with France in 1786, under which French brandies, which had previously been subject to a duty of something more than 9s. 6½ a gallon, were admitted into this country upon paying a duty of 7s. a gallon. All the duties on spirits have since been altered; and experience has incontrovertibly proved, that the present rates are not sufficiently favourable to rum, to compensate for the various disadvantages incident to that article, which, being brought from so much greater a distance, pays a much higher freight and insurance, suffers much more by leakage in the voyage, and evaporation from the climate, and which, moreover, requires for its production a much greater capital, and causes a much greater loss of interest on that capital, than the foreign brandies or gin of Europe. What I have here stated is most strictly true in time of peace. In time of war, the disadvantages of rum are much aggravated. It is made at much greater expence, and it is subjected to much more than double the peace cost of freight and insurance; none of which extraordinary expenses affect brandy or gin, which are brought to us not in our own ships, but in those of neutral powers. And, accordingly, it has repeatedly happened during the present war, that the selling price here of a puncheon of rum, made in our West Indies at a great expence, has actually been less than the cost of the cask, shipment, freight, insurance, duty, and charges of landing, warehouseing, and sale: so that it would have been well for the planter, if after incurring the expense of distillation, and all previous charges, he had lost his rum

by fire, or had himself caused it to be thrown into the drain of his still-house. Let us suppose a parallel case to occur to the landed produce of England; let us suppose that by the unlimited introduction of foreign corn raised in a country where taxes were very light, rent low, labour cheap, and where no tithes or poor's rate existed, the price of grain were to become so small in this kingdom as not to defray the mere cost of conveyance from the place of its growth (*Bay-fordbury* for instance) to market; and the market toll imposed upon the sale of it. I shall be thankful to Mr. Baker to inform me, how in such a state of things farmers would pay their rents, landlords the interest upon their mortgages, or either of them their taxes to government. — 4. As the preferable use of our own rums instead of foreign spirits, should in the case of individuals be promoted by *protecting duties*, (that is by subjecting foreign spirits to such higher duties than those paid by our own rums, as would somewhat more than countervail the greater cost of distilling the latter, and bringing them to market) so in the dealings of government (I have in my thought more particularly the Victualling Office purchases for supply of the navy) the use of rums should receive equal encouragement. Now, as all spirits supplied to the Victualling Office are exempted from duty, the natural mode of affording this encouragement seems to be, that the office should never purchase foreign spirits, unless the price of our own rums exceeded the price of such foreign spirits by a difference greater than the excess of the protecting duties. This is precisely what economical victualling officers would do (supposing the articles of equal goodness, and about this, I presume, there does not exist any question) if they dealt for the articles, as other people deal for them, subject to their respective duties: and, surely, the mere circumstance that government, to avoid the needless operations of receiving customs and excise with one hand, and paying the amount of them with the other, receives these articles duty free, can make no difference in the reason and justice of the cases. It will be said, that under the proposed practice government would pay to the planter for rums, a greater price than that for which brandies might be had. This is most undoubtedly true; and the same thing would be as undoubtedly true, if an individual should buy a gallon of rum, and a gallon of brandy (subject to the different duties) for the same price. It is the natural consequence of our colonial system and navigation laws. The English subject who happens to

have possessions in our West Indian islands, is compelled to bring the produce of those possessions to the English market, and in English ships. This condition was made for the benefit of the public revenue, of factors, and others residing in England; and above all, for the benefit of the national navy: and most highly has it benefited all these. In return for this so beneficial condition, prohibitions as to some foreign articles, and protecting duties as to others, were established, in order to ensure to the Englishman having West Indian possessions, a sale for his produce in the English market, to which he was compelled to bring that produce. If the system be right as applied to every individual Englishman who purchases spirits, I humbly conceive it cannot be wrong when applied to government, purchasing spirits on account of the aggregate body of Englishmen, and for their use or benefit. I believe that, in fact, until after the commercial treaty of 1786, rum alone was the spirit of the navy. But, however that may have been, to refuse to apply to the government purchases of spirits, the principle on which the protecting duties were founded, is in fact, to compel the English sugar-planter to send his rums in English vessels, under a monopoly freight, to the English market, and at the same time to prevent the sale of them, when he has so sent them thither, on such terms as would put him on a footing with the foreign producers of other spirits.

—X. X.—*Jan. 12, 1807.*

(*To be continued*)

SLAVE TRADE.

SIR,—It is highly necessary at this crisis, to address you upon the subject of the abolition of the Slave Trade, before parliament shall have proceeded to pass a final determination respecting that most important measure. As to the origin of the Slave Trade, it is superfluous on the present occasion to do any thing more than briefly to state, that it was established by royal charter and proclamations, and for a great number of years from time to time sanctioned, protected, and encouraged by divers acts of the British legislature, which have confirmed the West India colonists in the belief, and most perfect assurance and confidence, that they should continue to obtain supplies of labourers from Africa, and they have been induced to invest their fortunes in the British West India colonies, by the unshaken and full conviction that assurances solemnly pledged to them would not be violated. If the West India proprietors should be able to show that they cannot cultivate their proper-

ties without having recourse to Africa for labourers; if they have the strongest reasons for dreading that the abolition of the Slave Trade will strike a deadly blow at the very existence of their fortune, and, nay, even involve the British colonies in the West Indies and their inhabitants in one common scene of ruin, desolation, and destruction; surely, it may then be confidently affirmed, that to persevere in the accomplishment of such a scheme, is a plain dereliction of all the principles of justice, and an attempt to promote the purposes of humanity to the sons of Africa, at the expense of an immense sacrifice of the lives of British subjects, and of British property. The parliamentary documents and recent publications, which have appeared upon the subject of the West India trade, have most clearly and satisfactorily established, that this country derives great commercial advantages in various ways from her trade with those colonies, and that they are the most valuable appendages of the empire. If any stroke should sever from Britain that branch of commerce, can the ingenuity of any one suggest to the nation any mode of upholding its prosperity, after it shall have sustained so severe a loss?—It is peculiarly my business in this address, to call your attention to the consequences that must result from an abolition of the Slave Trade, which are particularly alarming to the colonists of the extensive island of Jamaica. Authentic reports and returns have shown that the cultivation of coffee has most rapidly increased in that colony in the last seven or eight years. A considerable number of coffee estates, which are still only infant settlements, cannot be cultivated with any prospect of advantage, without obtaining considerable supplies of labourers. An abolition will compel those coffee planters to sell their negroes immediately, and their lands will be of no value to them. Let me point out another attendant evil. The colony will also lose the benefit of their services in the various capacities of jurors, magistrates, and militia men ready to defend it against both an internal and external enemy; for, after they shall have been compelled to abandon their plantations, it cannot be expected that they will remain in a country, which will afford them no opportunities of improving their fortunes. Their negroes hitherto accustomed to reside in those parts of the island adapted to the cultivation of coffee, where a mild and temperate climate prevails, and to be employed in light and easy work, will in many instances be removed to a warmer climate, and will be engaged in the more laborious employment of cultiva-

ting the soil for the production of canes. They will, in short, be taken away from their habitations, and their gardens, and from other comforts endeared to them by habit. Allow me to present to your view with the utmost earnestness and anxiety, the disastrous and fatal consequences that must follow, if the measure of the abolition be adopted, from a diminution of the white population: consequences of which no one doubts, who is at all acquainted with the local circumstances of Jamaica. The business of West India estates is conducted by white persons, who reside upon them, and who are at present induced to seek their fortunes in that part of the world. The ground work of their fortunes is laid, whenever they have acquired as much money, as will enable them to purchase a few negroes. They continue to add to the number by their future savings, and their credit, and ultimately become settlers by purchasing lands. The white population of the colony is constantly kept up by such means, and a power exists, which is indispensably necessary for preserving due subordination, and for affording the only effectual mode of counterbalancing the negro population. After an abolition shall have been accomplished, no method of acquiring a fortune will present itself to persons in that line of life, and no adequate inducement can be held out to tempt the description of white persons, who have hitherto emigrated to our colonies to adventure thither in future. It will be impracticable to find white persons of good education and decent manners, disposed to reside in the West Indies; for, the offer even of augmented salaries, if the proprietors could afford to give them, will not induce them to hazard their lives in that unfavourable climate. It is painful in the extreme to contemplate the situation of Jamaica, which would then be left a prey to the schemes of the negroes, unrestrained by the presence of those, to whom they have been hitherto accustomed to pay respect and deference. Without appealing to the powers of the imagination we may learn from the sad experience of the disasters in St. Domingo, the fate of a colony, in which the black power reigns predominant, and uncontrouled.—Much has been said by the supporters of abolition, with the view of proving the ability of Jamaica to keep up its present stock of negroes without fresh importations. It may be proper to observe that, independently of any loss, which may be supposed to happen among the negroes newly imported, there is a great decrease of the negro population, which is in a great measure attributable to

the disproportion of the sexes, to promiscuous connections, and to other causes, over which no human care can exercise any controul. There are maladies peculiar to the climate of the West Indies, which are prevalent at all times, and reduce in despite of all medical aid and the utmost attention of the proprietors, an efficient labourer into a state of helplessness and decrepitude, and death often closes the scene. A disease also exists, which cuts off a great proportion of very young children within a few days after their births. Other disorders producing considerable mortality frequently happen among the negroes, and multitudes of them have perished by famine arising from hurricanes, and have fallen victims to sickness brought on by a scanty and unwholesome diet, which is one of the consequences attendant upon that calamity. I am aware that other circumstances which attach no blame to the proprietors, may be brought forward as contributing to account for the decrease of the negro population, and which have been dwelt on by intelligent writers upon this subject. Experience upon the whole has proved in opposition to fallacious theory, that the stock of negroes cannot be kept up without supplies of labourers from Africa. I have to ask, if it shall be impracticable from any of these causes to maintain a stock of negroes adequate to the purposes of cultivation, what is to become of the unfortunate planter after an abolition shall be passed? He can nowhere obtain the number of negroes required to supply the losses which have happened among his labourers, and ruin soon stares him in the face. His crops are rapidly diminished from year to year, and he beholds the miserable prospect of debt fast accumulating without possessing the power by his exertions to avert a total overthrow of all his fortune. It is only proposed to give an outline here of this miserable case, but nothing could be more easy than to fill it up with a detail of particulars. Many properties are known to be encumbered by mortgages, and it is equally notorious that the mortgagees of such properties have remained in possession of them for a great length of time past. If the Slave Trade should be abolished, those estates when restored to their owners would be delivered to them in a state incapable of yielding any advantage to them. The number of negroes attached to those properties will be exhausted through a long lapse of years from natural causes, during which time no additions to the stock have been made by purchase; for the creditors who may be desirous only of accomplishing payment of their demands by

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the crops, and who possess neither the power nor the inclination to increase their demands by purchasing negroes, will surrender the estates, in want of the indispensable means of future cultivation. Infants during a long minority will be exposed in numerous instances to the same consequences. In this rapid sketch I shall only glance at another circumstance, which may be apprehended from an abolition, and which it is most distressing to contemplate. A want of labourers will be urgently felt by the planters in general, and a supply will be sought for with avidity, as the only means of averting impending ruin. It will be impossible to prevent effectually a clandestine introduction of them. Such a mode of procuring negroes in the event of an abolition, may occasionally be resorted to under some difficulties.—At present, whilst a planter knows that he can at any time procure the number of negroes required for the use of his plantation, he takes care providently to make a suitable preparation for receiving at home the new labourers, whom he is desirous of obtaining. Before he proceeds to purchase them, he provides food, cloathing, and lodging for them. He carries them to his property, and they are properly taken care of. Hereafter, if he shall be forced when stimulated by the irresistible desire of struggling against imminent destruction, to have recourse to clandestine purchases, he will be anxious not to forego any opportunity of procuring labourers, which may present itself, and apprehensive that if he should postpone the buying of them, his object might altogether be defeated, he will purchase them, when he is not prepared to afford them proper necessities and comforts. I need not dwell on the miserable scenes which must then ensue.—It now remains for me to call your attention to another circumstance, which it is most painful to dwell on, and which is a source of great and well founded dread to the colonists. It is certain that an abolition will be considered by the negroes as connected with the prospect of an emancipation. Even the most unlettered and untutored mind is capable of discerning that the legislature, which has proceeded to declare that no person shall hereafter be brought to the British colonies in a state of slavery, has been influenced in a great degree to adopt the measure from an abhorrence of slavery; and that much of what has been advanced upon the subject has gone the length of reprobating the existence of slavery in any shape, or under any modification whatever. It will appear to the negroes employed in the service of the planters, that the supporters of

abolition have done them no service by stopping there, and that on the contrary, the scheme is fraught with injustice to them. The doctrine, which condemns the trade, by which negroes are imported into the West Indies in a state of slavery, cannot be true to its own principle, except it advances one step further, and seeks to annihilate all slavery: for, if the importation of a slave be condemnable, is not according to the same train of reasoning the keeping of a negro, who is already imported, and his offspring in a state of slavery, liable at least to equal severity of reprobation? I conceive that no one is bold enough to contend that emancipation ought to be made a part of the general plan; and, indeed, I have the authority of the name of Mr. Pitt, for saying that such a measure would be absolute insanity. It is apprehended on very substantial grounds, that the abolishing of this trade may dispose the minds of the colonial negroes to assert at their own time, and according to their own will and pleasure, their pretensions to emancipation; they may urge that the power, which has put a final period to the slave trade, would have proceeded at once to emancipate them, had it not been for the opposition of their masters; they may declare that the leading abolitionists have expressed their unwillingness to tolerate for a moment any description of slavery, and that they have refrained from urging that consideration upon the attention of parliament, either from a sense that the fit time for proposing it had not arrived, or from a conviction that to interfere to that extent would be assuming an improper exercise of power over concerns of private property. Is it to be expected that the labourers in the British West India colonies, will patiently and with due submission wait, until they shall become qualified in the opinion of some of the abolitionists to receive the gift of freedom through their means; or, until, according to the wild and fanciful notions of others, the amelioration of their condition will gradually produce their emancipation from the free will of their masters? It is to be dreaded, that the negroes, sensible that they possess a great superiority of numbers, and that their constitutions and habits of life render them able to contend with manifest advantage in countries abounding in fastnesses, and peculiarly favourable to their mode of warfare, will bring forward at no distant day, after the abolition shall be passed, their claims to freedom, and defy all that can be done against them by the combined efforts of a diminished white population, and of any proportion of regular military force, which

can be employed in endeavouring to quell their revolt. Their minds will be discontented by the hardships produced by the abolition, for they will soon observe with pain and vexation, that their owners debarred of the usual opportunities of obtaining fellow labourers to assist them in their occupations, will be compelled to augment their work with the view of postponing as long as they can, impending ruin. This awful crisis will come, when in consequence of the abolition, the white population of the colonies has been considerably lessened, and when the negroes looking around them in a country almost destitute of white inhabitants, will see no force capable of affording any effectual opposition to their schemes. Desolation may then rear its head unmolested, and the British colonies but, more especially, the extensive island of Jamaica at such a tremendous time, could expect no relief from any number of military troops, whose efforts would be unavailing in attempting to contend against a baneful climate, and the thousands upon thousands of their opponents inured to the situation, in which they had chosen to act, and deriving a most powerful auxiliary in the nature of the country. From these considerations I am led to conclude, that the abolition of the slave trade would occasion diminished commerce, diminished revenue, and diminished navigation; and in the end sap and totally remove the great corner stone of British prosperity, by the accomplishment of the total overthrow and destruction of her colonies.—MENTOR.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

RECAPTURE OF BUENOS AYRES. *From the London Gazette. Downing-street, January 27, 1807.*

Dispatches, of which the following are copies, have been received by the right hon. W. Windham, one of his majesty's principal Secretaries of State, from Lieut. Col. Backhouse, commanding a detachment of his majesty's land forces, in the River de la Plata.

Royal Charlotte (Transport), off Monte Video, Oct. 13, 1806.—SIR, Understanding that a vessel is to sail immediately for England, I do myself the honour to transmit to you a copy of a letter, addressed to Lieut. Gen. Sir D. Baird, in obedience to whose orders I sailed on the 29th Aug. last, with 1st batt. 47th reg. for the purpose of joining Major Gen. Beresford, in South America.

“Royal Charlotte (Transport), off Monte

Video, Oct. 13, 1806.—SIR, I have the honour to acquaint your excellency, that, on my arrival here, I had the mortification to find the city of Buenos Ayres recaptured, and that Major Gen. Beresford, with the forces under his command (after a most able and gallant defence), had been made prisoners of war, so far back as the 12th of Aug. last. Having arrived last night, I am not, at this moment, sufficiently acquainted with the particulars, to enable me to detail them, though I presume due and full information of this unfortunate and important event, must have been transmitted to you soon after its occurrence. You are aware, Sir, that the command of his majesty's land forces, at present in this River, devolves upon me; with which, in co-operation with the squadron under Sir Home Popham, it is my intention to occupy a favourable position, until a reinforcement shall arrive, or I may be honoured with your further instructions; and trust that, by an early opportunity, I shall be able to afford you a satisfactory report of my arrangements and operations in carrying your designs into execution. And am, &c.”

The immediate departure of the ship for England, and the situation in which I find myself unexpectedly placed, prevent any further communication than what is contained in the preceding letter. I have the honour to be, &c. T. J. BACKHOUSE, Col. commanding 47th reg.

Copy of a Dispatch from Lieut. Col. Backhouse, to the Right Hon. W. Windham, dated Maldonado, on the River de Plata, 31st Oct. 1806.

SIR, In my letter of the 13th instant, I had the honour to transmit a copy of my letter, of the same date, to His Ex. Lt. Gen. Sir D. Baird, apprizing him of my arrival in the River Plata, and of my intention to occupy a position on shore, to await his further orders. I, in consequence, immediately reconnoitred, from one of the frigates, which carried me sufficiently close in shore for the purpose; the works of the place, and the positions and defences in the vicinity of Monte Video, from which I formed, as the most eligible mode of attack, the idea of being able to carry the town and citadel by assault, on the south face edging on the water, in co-operation with the ships of the squadron, under Commodore Sir Home Popham, which were to silence the batteries on that face, so as to enable the troops to land and enter. *To be continued.*